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Abstract
In recent years, the success of deep learning has carried over
from discriminative models to generative models. In particu-
lar, generative adversarial networks (GANs) have facilitated
a new level of performance ranging from media manipulation
to dataset re-generation. Despite the success, the potential
risks of privacy breach stemming from GANs are less well
explored. In this paper, we focus on membership inference
attack against GANs that has the potential to reveal infor-
mation about victim models’ training data. Specifically, we
present the first taxonomy of membership inference attacks,
which encompasses not only existing attacks but also our
novel ones. We also propose the first generic attack model
that can be instantiated in various settings according to adver-
sary’s knowledge about the victim model. We complement
our systematic analysis of attack vectors with a comprehen-
sive experimental study, that investigates the effectiveness of
these attacks w.r.t. model type, training configurations, and
attack type across three diverse application scenarios ranging
from images, over medical data to location data. We show
consistent effectiveness in all the setups, which bridges the
assumption gap and performance gap in previous study with
a complete spectrum of performance across settings. We con-
clusively remind users to think over before publicizing any
part of their models.
1 Introduction
In the past few years, two categories of deep learning tech-
niques have made tremendous achievements over machine
learning tasks. The discriminative model has been success-
fully adopted in various prediction tasks, such as image
recognition [39, 51, 74, 78], speech recognition [36, 42], ma-
chine translation [15, 24], computer-aided disease diagno-
sis [7, 72], etc. The generative model, on the other hand, has
also gained increasing attention in recent years and has de-
livered appealing applications including photorealistic image
synthesis [35, 54, 63], image editing [34, 45, 89], text gener-
ation [11, 84], sound generation [59, 61], etc. Most of such
applications are supported by either the generative adversarial
networks (GANs) [10, 20, 35, 37, 47, 66, 70] or Variational
AutoEncoder (VAE) [49,67,87], which decently improve syn-
thesized media quality without leaving obvious artifacts.
In order to resonate the growing trend of deep learning in
real business, many IT companies do not only embed deep
learning models into their services to better market customers
or understand business operations, but also commercialize
deep learning itself as a service. They provide users with
platforms where users can define their own deep learning
tasks and apply the learned models, e.g., Google Prediction
API [3], Amazon Machine Learning [1], Microsoft Azure
Machine Learning [4], and BigML [2].
However, with the prevalence of online deep learning APIs,
data privacy violation frequently happened due to data misuse
with an inappropriate legal basis, e.g., the misuse of National
Health Service data in the DeepMind project [5]. Data pri-
vacy can also be challenged by malicious users who intend to
infer the original training data. The resulting privacy breach
would raise serious issues because training data either con-
tains sensitive attributes (e.g., a patient’s disease history) or is
cumbersome to collect. One such attack is membership infer-
ence [13, 31, 38, 69, 73] which aims to identify if a query data
record was used to train a deep learning model. Overfitting
to training data is the major cause for the feasibility of mem-
bership inference, as the learned model tends to memorize
training inputs and perform better on them.
There are two main motivations for conducting research
in membership inference attack. The first motivation is to
validate and quantify the privacy vulnerability of a deep learn-
ing model. For models against which inference attacks are
effective, owners can consider restricting their availability so
as also to avoid other mounted attacks (e.g., profiling [65]
or property inference [12, 60]). The second motivation is to
establish wrongdoing, where, e.g., regulators can be clued
from membership inference to propose the suspicion that a
model was trained on personal data without an adequate legal
basis [5].




















models has been largely explored [9, 13, 21, 43, 57, 60, 73, 88],
while inference against generative models is still an open
question. This is more challenging from the adversary side
because the victim model does not directly provide confi-
dence values about the overfitting of data records. Recently,
Hayes et al. [38] present a first approach targeting GANs,
which proposes to retrain a local copy of GAN in a black-
box setting and to check the discriminator’s confidence for
membership inference in a white-box setting. Their intuition
is that the overfitting of a victim GAN is either incorporated
in its discriminator or can be mimicked from a local copy of
the discriminator. Hilprecht et al. [41] extend membership
inference attack to both GANs and VAE via Monte Carlo
integration [62]. Their intuition is that an overfitted generator
tends to output data samples closer to the training data than
to unseen data.
However, neither of them provides a complete, compre-
hensive, and practical analysis of membership inference at-
tacks against GANs. For example, Hayes et al. [38] does
not consider the realistic situation where the discriminator in
a well-trained GAN is usually not deployed for query. Hil-
precht et al. [41] investigate on toy image datasets and does
not involve white-box attack against GANs. That motivates
our contributions along this direction towards a more system-
atic analysis.
1.1 Contributions
Taxonomy of membership inference attacks against
GANs. We propose a pioneering study to categorize at-
tack settings against GANs. Given increasing order of the
amount of knowledge about victim GAN accessible to the
adversary, the settings are benchmarked as (1) full black-box
generator, (2) partial black-box generator, (3) white-box gen-
erator, and (4) accessible discriminator . In particular, two of
the settings, the partial black-box and white-box settings, are
newly identified for attack model design. We then establish
the first taxonomy for the existing and proposed attacks. See
Section 3, Table 1, and Figure 1 for details.
The first generic attack model across settings and its
novel instantiated variants. We propose the first generic
attack model applicable to all the settings. See Section 4.1.
The instantiated attack variants in the partial black-box and
white-box settings are also the first attempts. See Section 4.3
and 4.4. Their effectiveness in Section 5.4 and 5.5, with a
complete spectrum of performance across settings, bridges
the gap between the existing full black-box attacks in [38,41]
and discriminator-accessible attack in [38]. See experimental
comparisons in Section 5.7. We remind users of the high risk
of privacy breach to publish the generator or even the input
interface to their generator.
Comprehensive analysis in each setting. We progres-
sively investigate attacks in each setting in the increasing
order of amount of knowledge to adversary. See Section 5.3
to 5.5. In each setting, our research spans several orthogonal
dimensions including three datasets with diverse modalities
(Section 5.1), five victim GAN models that were the state-of-
the-art at their release time (Section 5.1), two ablation study
w.r.t. GAN training configurations (Section 5.2), and attack
performance changes according to attack calibration (Sec-
tion 4.6 and 5.6) or differential privacy defense during GAN
training (Section 5.8).
1.2 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as the following. Section 2
reviews the related work in the fields including various gener-
ative models, and membership inference attack and defense
techniques. Section 3 elaborates attack taxonomy, and Sec-
tion 4 introduces our generic attack model and instantiated
attack variants for each setting. In Section 5, we evaluate at-
tack performance in thoses settings and compare to existing
work. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related work
Generative adversarial networks (GANs). A GAN
framework [10,20,35,37,47,66,70] consists of two neural net-
works, a generator and a discriminator, which are trained in an
adversarial manner to generate data approximating the train-
ing data distribution. The generator takes random noise (latent
code) as input and generates samples in the same modality
as training data, while the discriminator takes samples from
both the generator and training dataset as input and is trained
for differentiating the two sources. During training, the two
networks compete and evolve to reach the game equilibrium,
such that the generator learns to generate more and more
realistic samples aiming at fooling the discriminator, while
the discriminator learns to more and more accurately tell
the two sources apart. During testing, the discriminator is
usually removed from deployment. One insight of GAN is
to avoid hand-crafted similarity metric of sample-wise self-
supervision. Instead, the discriminator adversarially learns
deep features for a distribution-wise similarity metric. Exper-
imentally, the generator can learn to generate samples with
more realistic details, in contrast to only low-frequency accu-
racy from other hand-crafted metrics which average over train-
ing dataset. Therefore, GANs have shown improved photore-
alism in image synthesis [17, 54, 92], translation [45, 93, 94],
or manipulation [8, 79, 80].
On the other hand, because of the nature of excluding
sample-wise supervision, GANs implicitly model data dis-
tribution without processing individual images. Therefore,
GANs can also be employed to re-render new samples follow-
ing the original distribution but without revealing individual
samples. Privacy protection can thus be potentially achieved
by releasing only the distribution instead of the raw data to the
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public, e.g., GAN-based de-identification for sensitive human-
centric data [19, 58, 85] or health data [25, 86]. Therefore,
membership inference attack against GANs is naturally more
challenging.
We choose PGGAN [47], WGANGP [37], DCGAN [66],
and MEDGAN [25] as the victim models to be attacked
by membership inference, considering their pleasing perfor-
mances on generating images and other data representations.
Variational AutoEncoder (VAE). VAE is an alternative
generative framework [49, 67, 87] consists of two neural net-
works, an encoder and a decoder, which are cascaded to re-
construct data with sample-wise loss. The encoder maps data
into a latent space, while the decoder maps the encoded latent
representation back to data reconstruction. VAE regularizes
the encoder by imposing a prior (usually a standard normal
distribution) over the latent distribution. The VAE loss is then
composed of the reconstruction error and a prior regulariza-
tion in the form of Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Hybrid generative model. GANs often suffer from mode
collapse issue, i.e., failing to generate appearances relevant to
some training samples, due to the lack of sample-wise super-
vision, while VAE often lacks flexible hallucination capability.
Therefore, a hybrid model, VAEGAN [18, 52], is proposed to
jointly train a VAE and a GAN, where the VAE decoder and
the GAN generator are collapsed into one by sharing trainable
parameters. The GAN discriminator is used to measure sam-
ple similarity. We choose VAEGAN [18] as the fifth victim
model to be attacked by membership inference.
Membership inference attacks. Shokri et al. [73] speci-
fies attacks against discriminative models by exploiting dif-
ferences in the model’s response to inputs that were or were
not seen during training. Hayes et al. [38] specifies attacks
against GANs by retraining a local copy of the victim GAN
and checking the discriminator’s response to inputs. The latter
attack is more challenging because GAN naturally excludes
to sample-wise supervision and the retrained local copy may
not accurately detect overfitting of the original training data.
We also study in this direction but leverage only the pretrained
generator. Another concurrent study by Hilprecht et al. [41]
extends the attack against both GANs and VAE using Monte
Carlo integration, but they only show attack against GANs in
a black-box setting.
Other privacy-related attacks include model inversion [32,
33, 88], model extraction [82], model attribution [90], and
attacks against distributed deep learning systems [9, 43, 60].
None of them are designed to determine if an individual data
record belongs to the original training set or not, and thus
cannot directly adapt to our desired membership inference
attack against generative models.
Membership inference defenses. Regularization-based
defenses include weight normalization [71] and random
dropout [77]. Weight normalization is to reparameterize the
model weight vectors by decoupling the length of those
Latent Gen- Dis-
code erator criminator
[38] full black-box ×  ×
[41] full black-box ×  ×
Our full black-box (Sec. 4.2) ×  ×
Our partial black-box (Sec. 4.3) X  ×
Our white-box (Sec. 4.4) X  ×
[38] accessible discriminator × × X
Table 1: Taxonomy of attack settings against GANs over the
previous work and ours. (×: without access;X: with access;
: black-box; : white-box). The settings are more and more




 (1) Full black-box generator
 (2) Par tial black-box generator
 (3) White-box generator
 (4) Accessible discr iminator
real/fake?
Figure 1: Taxonomy diagram of attack models against GANs.
Gen: generator; Dis: discriminator; z: latent code input to the
generator.
weights from their direction, and apply to all layers in both
generator and discriminator in the victim model. Random
dropout can be used to prevent overfitting by randomly zero-
ing connections between neurons during training.
Differential privacy defenses [16, 22, 23, 26–30, 75, 76, 83,
86, 95] are to inject carefully-sampled noise in either the
forward passes or backward gradients during victim model
training, so as to perturb data-related objective functions and
thus mitigate inference attacks. We apply [29] in a variety of
setups to analyze in which circumstances and to what extents
it works.
3 Taxonomy of membership inference against
GANs
In general, attack settings can be categorized into either white-
box or black-box one. In the white-box setting, the victim
network parameters are accessible to attackers, whereas in the
black-box setting, they are unknown to attackers. Specifically
to the attack against GANs, we further distinguish the settings
based on the following criteria: (1) whether the discriminator
is accessible or not, (2) whether the generator is white-box
or black-box, and (3) whether the latent code of a generated
sample is accessible or not. We categorize the existing and
the proposed attacks in Table 1, and visualize different set-
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tings in Figure 1. We elaborate each possible category in the
following paragraphs in the decreasing order of the amount
of knowledge to attackers.
Accessible discriminator. This is the most knowledgeable
setting to attackers and it converts the attack against a GAN to
the attack against a classical discriminative model, no matter
whether the discriminator is white-box or black-box. Existing
attack methods against discriminator models can be applied to
this setting. For example, Shokri et al. [73] infer membership
by checking the confidence value of the discriminator. This
setting is also considered in [38], corresponding to the last row
in Table 1. In practice, however, the discriminator of a well-
trained GAN is usually discarded without being deployed
to APIs, and thus not accessible to attackers. We, therefore,
devote less effort to investigating the discriminator and mainly
focus on the following practical settings where the attackers
only have access to the generator.
White-box generator. This is the most knowledgeable set-
ting to attackers when the discriminator of a GAN is no longer
accessible. Attackers have access to the parameters of the gen-
erator. This is a realistic open-source scenario where users
publish their well-trained generator without releasing the un-
derlying training data. This scenario is also commonly studied
in the community of differential privacy [29]. However, this
is a novel setting for membership inference attack against
GANs, which is not explored in [38] or [41]. It corresponds
to the second last row in Table 1 and Section 4.4.
Partial black-box generator (known input-output pair).
This is a less knowledgeable setting to attackers where they
have no access to the parameters of the generator but have
access to the latent code of each generated sample. This is also
a realistic scenario where attackers submit their latent code as
input and collect corresponding generated samples from the
generator. This is another novel setting and not considered
in [38] or [41]. It corresponds to the third last row in Table 1
and Section 4.3.
Full black-box generator (known output only). This is
the least knowledgeable setting to attackers where they are
unable to provide input but just blindly query samples from
the well-trained black-box generator. This corresponds to
the practical scenario of closed-source GAN-based APIs.
Hayes et al. [38] investigate attacks in this setting by retrain-
ing a local copy of the API. Hilprecht et al. [41] sample data
from the generator and use Monte Carlo approximation to
score each query based on an elaborated design of distance
metric between the query and the generated samples. Our
idea is similar in spirit to Hilprecht et al. [41] but we de-
sign a low-skill attack method with a simpler implementation
(Section 4.2) that achieves comparable or better performance
(Section 5.3). Our attack and theirs correspond to the third,






z Latent code (input to the generator)
Dtrain Training set of the victim generator
Gr Attacker’s reference generator, described in Section 4.6
Table 2: Notations.
4 Membership inference attack against GANs
We first describe our generic attack model in Section 4.1,
which applies to all the settings. Based on that, we introduce
three attack variants under different settings from Section 4.2
to 4.4, respectively. Since our attack depends on sample dis-
tance metric, we elaborate our metric design in Section 4.5. Fi-
nally, we propose an attack calibration method in Section 4.6
to mitigate the relevance between our inference prediction
and the generation difficulty of individual queries.
4.1 Generic attack model
We first summarize the notations used in the paper in Table 2.
We formulate the membership inference attack as a binary
classification task where we threshold the reconstruction error
between a query sample x and its reconstructed copy R (x|Gv)
from the well-trained victim generator Gv. Our intuition is
that, given access to a generator, we should reconstruct sam-
ples better if they belong to the GAN training set, no matter









x 6∈ Dtrain else
(1)
where L(·, ·) is a distance metric between two samples and
is elaborated in Section 4.5 and 4.6, and ε is a pre-defined
threshold. See Figure 2(a) for a diagram.
The attacker’s goal is then to design R such that it activates
the most accurate possible performance of Gv to approximate
a query sample. In the following sections, we instantiate vari-
ants of R for different attack settings in the increasing order
of the amount of knowledge to attackers.
4.2 Full black-box attack
We start with the least knowledgeable setting where an at-
tacker only has access to a black-box generator Gv. The at-
tacker is allowed no other operation but blindly collecting k
samples from Gv, denoted as {Gv(·)i}ki=1. Gv(·) indicates that























































(c) Partial black-box and white-box at-










(d) Attack calibration (Sec. 4.6)
Figure 2: Diagram of our attacks. Mathematical notations refer to Table 2. P represents data distribution. The attacker’s goal is to
infer if query samples x1 and x2 are members of real dataset Dtrain which is used to train Gv. A high-quality Gv approximates
training data distribution very well so that PGv should be close enough to PDtrain . That enables attacks based on PGv . x1 is a
member of Dtrain so that it should be better represented by Gv with a smaller distance to its reconstructed copy R(x1|Gv). x2 is
not a member of Dtrain so that it should have a larger distance to its nearest neighbor R(x2|Gv) in PGv . An attacker in (a) just
needs a decision boundary based on such a reconstruction distance to infer membership. In (b) the nearest neighbor is determined
by sampling from PGv while in (c) it is done by optimization on the manifold of PGv . In (d) PGr is a third-party reference GAN
distribution where the reconstruction distance is calibrated by subtracting the distance between x and R(x|Gr). See Section 4 for
more details.
input. We then define the reconstruction of x as the nearest
neighbor from {Gv(·)i}ki=1. Mathematically,
R (x|Gv) = arg min
xˆ∈{Gv(·)i}ki=1
L(x, xˆ) (2)
See Figure 2(b) for a diagram. Larger k leads to better recon-
struction while sacrificing computation efficiency. Given a
limited budget, we fix k to 20k throughout the experiments.
4.3 Partial black-box attack
Due to the curse of dimensionality, random samples in the
black-box attack are sparsely distributed in the high dimen-
sional space. The blind nearest neighbor search without con-
sidering the latent code input z may fail to find an accurate
reconstruction. As the access to z is permitted in the partial
black-box setting, we propose to establish attack exploiting z.
Concretely, the attacker performs an optimization w.r.t. z
in order to accurately reconstruct the query samples x. Mathe-
matically,









See Figure 2(c) for a diagram. Without knowing the pa-
rameters of Gv, the optimization is not differentiable and no
gradient information is available. As only the evaluation of
function (forward-pass through the generator) is allowed by
the access of {z,Gv(z)} pair, we propose to approximate the
optimum via the Powell’s Conjugate Direction Method [64].
4.4 White-box attack
In the white-box setting, we have the same reconstruction
formulation as in Section 4.3. See Figure 2(c) for a diagram.
More advantageously to attackers, the reconstruction quality
can be further boosted thanks to access to the parameters ofGv.
This is because the optimization becomes differentiable with
gradient backpropagation w.r.t. z, which can be more accu-
rately solved by advanced first-order optimization algorithms,
namely Adam [48], RMSPROP [81], and L-BFGS [55]. We
tried all the three in our ablation study and found L-BFGS
performs the best in terms of convergence rate.
4.5 Distance metric
Our baseline distance metric Lbase(·, ·) consists of three terms:
the element-wise (pixel-wise) difference term L2 targets low-
frequency components, the deep image feature term Llpips (i.e.,
the Learned Perceptual Image Patch Similarity (LPIPS) met-
ric [91]) targets realism details, and the regularization term





L2(x,Gv(z)) = ‖x−Gv(z)‖22 (6)
Lreg(z) =
(‖z‖22−dim(z))2 (7)
λ1, λ2 and λ3 are used to enable/disable and balance the order
of magnitude of each loss term, the values of which depend
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on experiment configurations. For non-image data, λ2 = 0
because LPIPS is no longer applicable. For full black-box
attack, λ3 = 0 because z is not accessible by the attacker.
4.6 Attack calibration
We noticed that the reconstruction error is query-dependent,
i.e., some query samples are more difficult to reconstruct
due to their intrinsically more complicated representations.
In this case, the reconstruction error is dominated by the
representations rather than by the membership clues. We,
therefore, propose to mitigate the query dependency by first
training a reference GAN Gr with another disjoint dataset,
and then calibrating our base reconstruction error according
to the reference reconstruction error. Mathematically,
L(x,Gv(z)) = Lbase(x,Gv(z))−Lbase(x,Gr(z)) (8)
The optimization on the well-trained Gr is the same as on Gv.
See Figure 2(d) for a diagram.
5 Experiments
We discuss the experimental setup in Section 5.1. We pro-
pose two dimensions of ablation study in Section 5.2. From
Section 5.3 to 5.5, we evaluate our attacks in three settings.
We present the attack performance gain from calibration in
Section 5.6. In Section 5.7, we compare with three baseline
attack models. Finally, we investigate the effectiveness of one
popular privacy defense scheme against our attack in various
settings in Section 5.8.
5.1 Setup
Datasets. Hilprecht et al. [41] limit their investigations on
low-resolution toy image datasets, e.g., MNIST [53] and
CIFAR-10 [50]. We push our attack scenarios towards realism
by conducting experiments on three modalities of datasets
covering images, medical records, and location check-ins,
which are considered with a high risk of privacy breach.
CelebA [56] is a large-scale face attributes dataset with
200k RGB images. Images are aligned to each other based
on facial landmarks, which benefits GAN performance. We
select at most 20k images, center-crop them, and resize them
to 64×64 before GAN training.
MIMIC-III [46] is a public Electronic Health Records
(EHR) database containing medical records of 46,520 in-
tensive care unit (ICU) patients. We follow the same proce-
dure as in [25] to pre-process the data, where each patient is
represented by a 1071-dimension binary feature vector. We
filter out patients with repeated vector presentations and yield
41,307 unique samples.
Instagram New-York [14] contains Instagram users’ check-
ins at various locations in New York at different time stamps
PG WGAN- DC- VAE- SOTA PGGAN
GAN GP GAN GAN ref w/ DP
FID 14.86 24.26 35.40 53.08 7.40 15.63
Table 3: FID for different GAN models trained on CelebA.
“SOTA ref” represents the state-of-the-art result reported in
[20] over 128×128 ImageNet ILSVRC 2012 dataset [68]. “w/
DP” represents the GAN model with DP privacy protection [6]
(see Section 5.8).
from 2013 to 2017. We filter out users with less than 100
check-ins and yield 34,336 remaining samples. For sample
representation, we first select 2,024 evenly-distributed time
stamps. We then concatenate the longitude and latitude val-
ues of the check-in location at each time stamp, and yield a
4048-dimension vector for each sample. The longitude and
latitude values are either retrieved from the dataset or linearly
interpolated from the available neighboring time stamps. We
then perform zero-mean normalization before GAN training.
Victim GAN models. We choose PGGAN [47],
WGANGP [37], DCGAN [66], MEDGAN [25], and
VAEGAN [18] into the victim model set, considering their
pleasing performance on generating images and/or other data
representations. We only train a subset of GAN models that
are applicable for each dataset.
It is important to guarantee the high quality of well-trained
GANs because attackers are more likely to target high-quality
GANs with practical effectiveness. We noticed previous
work [38, 41] only shows qualitative results of their victim
GANs. In particular, Hayes et al. [38] did not show visually
pleasing generation on the Labeled Faces in the Wild (LFW)
dataset [44]. It may result from the mismatch between the
dataset and their GAN models. Rather, we present better qual-
itative results of different GANs on CelebA (Figure 3), and
further present the corresponding quantitative evaluation in
terms of Fréchet Inception Distance (FID) metric [40] (Ta-
ble 3). A smaller FID indicates the generated image set is
more realistic and closer to real-world data distribution. We
show that our GAN models are in a reasonable range from
the state of the art.
Attack evaluation. The proposed membership inference at-
tack is formulated as a binary classification given a threshold
ε in Equation 1. Through varying ε, we measure the area un-
der the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUCROC) to
evaluate the attack performance. ROC reflects the relation be-
tween false-positive rate and true-positive rate given varying
thresholds for a binary classification task and is robust to class
imbalance. With a value range of [0,1], a larger AUCROC in-
dicates a higher true-positive rate in a variety of thresholding,
and thus better classification (attack) performance.
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(a) PGGAN (b) WGANGP (c) DCGAN (d) VAEGAN (e) PGGAN w/ DP
Figure 3: Generated images from different victim GAN models trained on CelebA.
5.2 Ablation study
We first list two dimensions of ablation study across attack
settings. There are also some other dimensions specifically
on the white-box attack, which is elaborated in Section 5.5.
GAN training set size. Training set size is highly related
to the degree of overfitting of GAN training. A GAN model
trained with a smaller size tends to more easily memorize
individual training images and is thus more vulnerable to
membership inference attack. Therefore, we evaluate the at-
tack performance w.r.t. training set size. We exclude DCGAN
and VAEGAN from evaluation since they yield unstable train-
ing for small training sets.
Random v.s. identity-based selection for GAN training
set. There are different levels of difficulty for membership
inference attack. For example, CelebA contains person iden-
tity information and we can design attack difficulty by com-
posing GAN training set based on identity or not. In one case,
we include all images of the selected individuals for training.
In the other case, we ignore identity information and randomly
select images for training. The former case is relatively easier
to attackers with a larger margin between membership image
set and non-membership image set. Therefore, we evaluate
these two kinds of training set selection schemes on CelebA.
5.3 Evaluation on full black-box attack
We start with evaluating our preliminary low-skill black-box
attack model in order to gain a sense of the difficulty of the
whole problem.
Performance w.r.t. GAN training set size. Figure 4(a) to
4(c) plot the attack performance against different GAN mod-
els on the three datasets. The attack performs sufficiently well
when the training set is small for all three datasets. For in-
stance, on CelebA, when the training set contains up to 512
images, attacker’s AUCROC on both PGGAN and WGANGP
are above 0.95. This indicates an almost perfect attack and
a serious privacy breach. For larger training sets, however,
the attacks become less effective as the degree of overfitting
decreases and GAN’s capability shifts from memorization
to hallucination. That reminds users to collect more data
for GAN training in order to reduce privacy breach for each
individual sample. Moreover, PGGAN becomes more vul-
nerable than WGANGP on CelebA when the training size
becomes larger. WGANGP is consistently more vulnerable
than MEDGAN on MIMIC-III regardless of training size.
Performance w.r.t. GAN training set selection. Figure
5(a) shows the comparisons against four victim GAN mod-
els. We find that, consistently, all the GAN models are more
vulnerable when the training set is selected based on identity.
That reminds users to pay more attention to identity-based
privacy breach, which is more likely to happen than instance-
based privacy breach. Moreover, DCGAN and VAEGAN are
more resistant against full black-box attack with AUCROC
only marginally above 0.5 (random guess baseline). The re-
sistance order is inversely correlated to the generation quality
order of GANs in Tabel 3. That reminds users that a better
GAN performance is at the cost of a higher privacy breach
risk.
5.4 Evaluation on partial black-box attack
We then equip attackers with more knowledge to perform
partial black-box attack.
Performance w.r.t. GAN training set selection. Fig-
ure 5(b) shows the comparison on four victim GAN models.
We find that all models become more vulnerable to identity-
based selection. Still, DCGAN is the most resistant victim
against membership inference in both training set selection
schemes.
Comparison to full black-box attack. Comparing be-
tween Figure 5(a) and 5(b), the attack performance against
each GAN model consistently and significantly improves
from black-box setting to partial black-box setting, which
reminds users not to provide the input interface to unautho-
rized ones.
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Figure 4: Full black-box attack (the first row) and white-box attack (the second row) performance w.r.t. GAN training set size.
See Table 6 and Table 9 in Appendix for quantitative results.







































Figure 5: Attack performance on the random v.s. identity-based GAN training set selection. We only focus on CelebA across
attack settings. See Table 7 in Appendix for quantitative results.
5.5 Evaluation on white-box attack
We further equip attackers with access to the parameters of the
generator to perform white-box attack. As the optimization in
white-box attack involves more technical details, we conduct
additional ablation study and sanity check in this setting.
Ablation on optimization initialization. Due to the non-
convexity of our optimization problem, the choice of ini-
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L2 + Llpips + Lreg
(c)
Figure 6: Reconstruction error plots of PGGAN-generated samples on CelebA. The x-axis represents the Euclidean distance
between a reconstructed latent code to its ground truth value. The y-axis represents the L2 residual in the image domain. The
images in orange frame are generated samples. Their reconstructed copies are shown on their right. Samples below the dashed
line have reconstruction residuals smaller than 0.01, where no visual difference can be observed. Therefore, the reconstruction is
in general better if there is a higher portion of sample points below the dashed line (a higher successful reconstruction rate).
(a) Reconstruction results when disabling Llpips and Lreg (λ1 = 1.0, λ2 = 0, λ3 = 0). (b) Reconstruction results when disabling
Lreg (λ1 = 1.0, λ2 = 0.2, λ2 = 0). (c) Reconstruction results when enabling all the L2,Llpips and Lreg terms (λ1 = 1.0, λ1 = 0.2,
λ2 = 0.001). We find that using all the terms most benefits the reconstruction.



































Figure 7: Convergence rate of various optimizers (Adam,
RMSProp, L-BFGS) with different learning rates. Mean ini-
tialization (z0 = µ) is applied in this ablation study.
tialization is of great importance. We explore three differ-
ent initialization heuristics in our experiments, including
mean (z0 = µ), random (z0 ∼N (µ,Σ)), and nearest neighbour
(z0 = argminz∈{zi}ki=1‖Gv(z)−x‖
2
2). We find that the mean and
nearest neighbor initialization perform well in practice, and
are in general better than random initialization in terms of the
successful reconstruction rate (reconstruction error smaller
than 0.01). Therefore, we apply the mean and nearest neigh-
bor initialization in parallel, and choose the one with smaller
reconstruction error for the attack.
Ablation on optimization method. We explore three opti-
mizers with a range of hyper-parameter search: Adam [48],
DCGAN PGGAN WGANGP VAEGAN
Success rate (%) 99.89 99.83 99.55 99.25
Table 4: Successful reconstruction rate for generated samples
from different GANs.
RMSProp [81], and L-BFGS [55] for reconstructing gener-
ated samples of PGGAN on CelebA. Figure 7 shows that
L-BFGS achieves superior convergence rate with no addi-
tional hyper-parameter. Therefore, we select L-BFGS as our
default optimizer in the white-box setting.
Ablation on distance metric design for optimization. We
show the effectiveness of our objective design (Equation 5).
Although optimizing only for element-wise term L2 yields
reasonably good reconstruction in most cases, we observe
undesired blur in reconstruction for CelebA images. Incorpo-
rating deep image feature term Llpips and regularization term
Lreg benefits the successful reconstruction rate. See Figure 6
for a demonstration.
Sanity check on distance metric design for optimization.
In addition, we check if the non-convexity of our objective
function affects the feasibility of attack against different vic-
tim GANs. We apply optimization to reconstruct generated
samples. Ideally, the reconstruction should have no error be-
cause the query samples are directly generated by the model,
i.e., their preimages exist. We set a threshold of 0.01 to the re-
construction error for counting successful reconstruction rate,
and evaluate the success rate for four GAN models trained
9












L2 + Llpips + Lreg
Figure 8: White-box attack performance against various
GANs on CelebA, w.r.t. distance metric design for classi-
fication. See Table 8 in Appendix for quantitative results.
on CelebA. Table 4 shows that we obtained more than 99%
success rate for all the GANs, which verifies the feasibility of
our optimization-based attack.
Ablation on distance metric design for classification.
We propose to enable/disable λ1, λ2, or λ3 in Equation 5 to in-
vestigate the contribution of each term towards classification
thresholding (membership inference) on CelebA. In detail, we
consider using (1) the element-wise difference term L2 only,
(2) the deep image feature term Llpips only, and (3) all the
three terms together to evaluate attack performance. Figure 8
shows the AUCROC of attack against each various GANs. We
find that our complete distance metric design achieves general
superiority to single terms. Therefore, we use the complete
distance metric for classification thresholding.
Moreover, the attack is less effective against DCGAN
while more effective against VAEGAN. The success in at-
tacking VAEGAN can be explained by the sample-wise self-
supervision during VAEGAN training, which enforces to
memorize training data. Therefore, we argue that combin-
ing VAE and GAN may alleviate mode collapse but at the
cost of higher privacy breach risk.
Performance w.r.t. GAN training set size. Figure 4(d) to
4(f) plot the attack performance against different GAN models
on the three datasets. We find that the attack becomes less ef-
fective as the training set becomes larger, similar to that in the
black-box setting. For CelebA, the attack remains effective for
20k training samples, while for MIMIC-III and Instagram, this
number decreases to 8192 and 2048, respectively. The strong
similarity between the member and non-member in these two
non-image datasets increases the difficulty for attack, which
explains the deteriorated performance.
Performance w.r.t. GAN training set selection. Figure
5(c) shows the comparisons against four victim GAN models.
Our attack is much more effective when we compose GAN
training set according to identity, which is similar to those in
the full and partial black-box settings.
Comparison to full and partial black-box attacks. For
membership inference attack, it is an important question
whether or to what extent the white-box attack is more ef-
fective than the black-box ones. We find that against GAN
models the white-box attack is much more effective. Compar-
isons across subfigures in Figure 5 show that the AUCROC
values increase by at least 0.03 when changing from full black-
box to white-box setting. Compared to the partial black-box
attack, the white-box attack achieves noticeably better perfor-
mance against PGGAN and VAEGAN. Moreover, conducting
white-box attack requires much less time cost than conducting
partial black-box attack. Therefore, we conclude that provid-
ing users with model parameters (white-box setting) does
incur high privacy breach risk.
5.6 Performance gain from attack calibration
We perform calibration on all the settings. Especially for full
and partial black-box settings, attackers do not have prior
knowledge on victim model architectures. We thus train a
PGGAN on LFW face dataset [44] and use it as the generic
reference model for calibrating all victim models trained on
CelebA. Similarly, for MIMIC-III, we use WGANGP as the
reference model for MedGAN and vice versa. In other words,
we have to guarantee that our calibrated attacks strictly follow
the black-box assumption.
Figure 9 compares attack performance on CelebA before
and after applying calibration. The AUCROC values are im-
proved consistently across all the GAN architectures in all the
settings. In general, the white-box attack calibration yields the
greatest performance gain. Moreover, the improvement is es-
pecially significant when attacking against VAEGAN, as the
AUCROC value increases by 0.2 after applying calibration.
Figure 10 compares attack performance on the other two
non-image datasets. The performance is also consistently
boosted for all training set sizes after calibration.
5.7 Comparison to baseline attacks
We compare our calibrated attack to two recent membership
inference attack baselines: Hayes et al. [38] (denoted as LO-
GAN) and Hilprecht et al. [41] (denoted as MC, standing for
their proposed Monte Carlo sampling method). As described
in our taxonomy (Section 3), LOGAN includes a full black-
box attack model and a discriminator-accessible attack model
against GANs. The latter is regarded as the most knowledge-
able but unrealistic setting because the discriminator in GAN
is usually not accessible in practice. But we still compare to
both settings for the completeness of our taxonomy and exper-
iments. MC includes a full black-box attack model but does
not include a white-box attack model against GANs. Their
white-box attack model is only targeting VAE. We thus only
compare to their former model. Note that, to the best of our
10













































Figure 9: Attack performance before and after calibration on CelebA. See Table 10 in Appendix for quantitative results.




























































Figure 10: Attack performance before and after calibration for non-image datasets w.r.t. GAN training set sizes. See Table 11 in
Appendix for quantitative results.
















full black-box (ours calibrated)
partial black-box (ours calibrated)
white-box (ours calibrated)
accessible discriminator (LOGAN)
Figure 11: Comparison of different attacks on CelebA. See
Table 12 in Appendix for quantitative results.
knowledge, there does not exist another attack against GANs
in the partial black-box or white-box settings.
Figure 11 and 12 show the comparisons, considering sev-
eral datasets, victim GAN models, and GAN training set sizes,
and across different settings. We skip MC on the non-image
datasets as it is not directly applicable in terms of their dis-
tance calculation. Our findings are as follow.
In black-box setting, our low-skill attack consistently out-
performs MC and outperforms LOGAN on the non-image
datasets. It also achieves comparable performance to LOGAN
on CelebA but with a much simpler implementation.
Our white-box and even partial black-box attacks consis-
tently outperform the other full black-box attacks, which re-
minds users that the release of the generator or even just the
input to the generator can lead to severe risk of privacy breach.
With a complete spectrum of performance across settings,
they bridge the performance gap between LOGAN black-box
attack and LOGAN discriminator-accessible attack.
LOGAN with access to the discriminator is the most effec-
tive attack, except when against VAEGAN. The effectiveness
11


































































Figure 12: Comparison of different attacks on the other two non-image datasets w.r.t. GAN training set size. See Table 13 in




















Figure 13: Attack performance against PGGAN on CelebA
with or without DP defense. See Table 14 in Appendix for
quantitative results.
can be explained by the fact that the discriminator is explicitly
trained to maximize the margin between training set (member-
ship samples) and generated set (a subset of non-membership
samples), which eventually yields very accurate confidence
scores for membership inference. However, the discrimina-
tor score is not very effective against VAEGAN because its
training relies more on sample-wise supervision than on the
adversarial loss. Although this is not a fair comparison due to
the more knowledgeable assumption, it reminds users of the
exceptional risk of publishing the discriminator.
5.8 Defense
We investigate one popular defense mechanism against mem-
bership inference attack, i.e., the differential private (DP)
stochastic gradient descent [6]. The algorithm can be summa-
rized into two steps. First, the per-sample gradient computed















full black-box w/o DP
full black-box w/ DP
white-box w/o DP
white-box w/ DP
Figure 14: Attack performance against PGGAN on CelebA
with or without DP defense, w.r.t. GAN training set size. See
Table 15 in Appendix for quantitative results.
at each training iteration is clipped by its L2 norm with a
pre-defined threshold. Second, random noise is added to this
gradient in order to protect privacy. The noisy gradient is
then used for gradient descent optimization. In this scheme,
however, privacy protection is at the cost of computational
complexity and utility deterioration, i.e., slower training and
lower generation quality.
We conduct attacks against PGGAN on CelebA, which
has been defended by DP. We skip the other cases because
DP always deteriorates generation quality to an unacceptable
level. The DP hyper-parameters are selected through the grid
search. We fix the norm threshold to 1.0 and the noise scale
to 10−4.
Figure 13 and 14 depict the attack performance in different
settings. We observe a consistent decrease in AUCROC in
all the settings. Therefore, DP is effective in general against
our attack. However, applying DP into training leads to a
12
much higher computation cost (10× slower) in practice due
to the per-sample gradient modification. Moreover, DP results
in a deterioration of GAN utility, which is witnessed by an
increasing FID (comparing the last and second columns in
Table 3). Moreover, for obtaining a pleasing level of utility,
the noise scale has to be limited to a small value, which, in
turn, cannot defend membership inference attack completely.
For example, for all the settings, our attack still achieves better
performance than the random guess baseline (AUCROC =
0.5).
6 Conclusion
We have established the first taxonomy of membership infer-
ence attacks against GANs, with which we hope to benchmark
research in this direction in the future. We have also proposed
the first generic attack model based on reconstruction, that
is applicable to all the settings according to the amount of
attacker’s knowledge about the victim model. In particular,
the instantiated attack variants in the partial black-box and
white-box settings are our another novelty to bridge the as-
sumption and performance gap in the previous work [38, 41].
Comprehensive experiments show consistent effectiveness
and a complete spectrum of performance in a variety of se-
tups spanning three datasets, five victim GAN models, two
directions of ablation study, attack calibration, as well as dif-
ferential privacy defense, which conclusively remind users to
be careful about releasing any part of their models.
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We set λ1 = 1.0, λ2 = 0.2, λ3 = 0.001 for our partial black-
box and white-box attack on CelebA, and set λ1 = 1.0, λ2 =
0.0, λ3 = 0.0 for the other cases. The maximum number of
iterations for optimization are set to be 1000 for our white-box
attack and 10 for our partial black-box attack.
A.2 Model architectures
We use the official implementations of the victim GAN
models.1 We re-implement WGANGP model with a fully-
connected structure for non-image datasets. The network ar-
chitecture is summarized in Table 5. The depth of both the
generator and discriminator is set to 5. The dimension of the
hidden layer is fix to be 512 . We use ReLU as the activation
function for the generator and Leaky ReLU with α= 0.2 for
the discriminator, except for the output layer where either the
sigmoid or identity function is used.
Generator Generator Discriminator
(MIMIC-III) (Instagram) (MIMIC-III and Instagram)
FC (512) FC (512) FC (512)
ReLU ReLU LeakyReLU (0.2)
FC (512) FC (512) FC (512)
ReLU ReLU LeakyReLU (0.2)
FC (512) FC (512) FC (512)
ReLU ReLU LeakyReLU (0.2)
FC (512) FC (512) FC (512)
ReLU ReLU LeakyReLU (0.2)
FC (dim(x)) FC (dim(x)) FC (1)
Sigmoid Identity Identity
Table 5: Network architecutre of WGANGP on MIMIC-III
and Instagram.
A.3 Implementation of baseline attacks
We provide more details of implementing baseline attacks
that are discussed in Section 5.7.
LOGAN. For CelebA, we employ DCGAN as the attack
model, which is the same as in the original paper [38]. For
MIMIC-III and Instagram, we use WGANGP as the attack
model.
MC. For implementing MC on CelebA, we apply the same
process of their best attack on RGB image dataset: First, we
employ principal component analysis (PCA) on a data subset





components as suggested in the original paper [41] and apply
dimensionality reduction on the generated and query data.
Finally, we calculate the Euclidean distance of the projected
data and use the median heuristic to choose the threshold for
MC attack.
B Quantitative results
B.1 Evaluation on full black-box attack
Attack performance w.r.t. training set size. Table 6 cor-
responds to Figure 4(a), 4(b), and 4(c) in the main paper.
(a) CelebA
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 20k
PGGAN 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.79 0.58 0.51
WGANGP 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.89 0.72 0.62 0.51
(b) MIMIC-III
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
WGANGP 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.68 0.54 0.52
MEDGAN 0.78 0.65 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.51
(c) Instagram
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 10k
WGANGP 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.72 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.50
Table 6: Full black-box attack performance w.r.t. training set
size.
Attack performance w.r.t. training set selection. Table 7
corresponds to Figure 5 in the main paper.
(a) Full black-box
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
random 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.50
identity 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.51
(b) Partial black-box
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
random 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.55
identity 0.57 0.60 0.55 0.58
(c) White-box
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
random 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.61
identity 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.63
Table 7: Attack performance on the random v.s. identity-based
GAN training set selection. We only focus on CelebA across
attack settings.
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B.2 Evaluation on partial black-box attack
Attack performance w.r.t. training set selection. Table 7
corresponds to Figure 5 in the main paper.
B.3 Evaluation on white-box attack
Ablation on distance metric design for classification. Ta-
ble 8 corresponds to Figure 8 in the main paper.
DCGAN PGGAN WGANGP VAEGAN
L2 0.54 0.59 0.59 0.62
Llpips 0.55 0.58 0.57 0.61
L2+Llpips+Lreg 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.63
Table 8: White-box attack performance against various GANs
on CelebA, w.r.t. distance metric design for classification.
Attack performance w.r.t. training set size. Table 9 cor-
responds to Figure 4(d), 4(e), and 4(f) in the main paper.
(a) CelebA
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 20k
PGGAN 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.83 0.62 0.55
WGANGP 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.89 0.78 0.69 0.53
(b) MIMIC-III
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
WGANGP 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.87 0.82 0.80 0.67 0.54
MEDGAN 0.99 0.88 0.77 0.72 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.52
(c) Instagram
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 10k
WGANGP 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.72 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.49
Table 9: White-box attack performance w.r.t. training set size.
Attack performance w.r.t. training set selection. Table 7
corresponds to Figure 5 in the main paper.
B.4 Attack calibration
Table 10 corresponds to Figure 9 in the main paper. Table 11
corresponds to Figure 10 in the main paper.
(a) Full black-box
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
before calibration 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.51
after calibration 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.51
(b) Partial black-box
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
before calibration 0.57 0.60 0.55 0.58
after calibration 0.58 0.63 0.56 0.59
(c) White-box
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
before calibration 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.63
after calibration 0.68 0.64 0.55 0.76
Table 10: Attack performance before and after calibration on
CelebA.
(a) MIMIC-III (WGANGP)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 20k
full bb 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.87 0.81 0.68 0.54 0.52
full bb (calibrated) 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.67 0.56
wb 0.98 0.96 0.92 0.87 0.82 0.80 0.67 0.54
wb (calibrated) 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.75 0.59
(b) MIMIC-III (MEDGAN)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
full bb 0.78 0.65 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.51
full bb (calibrated) 0.91 0.71 0.63 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.51
wb 0.99 0.88 0.77 0.72 0.61 0.59 0.55 0.52
wb (calibrated) 0.96 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.65 0.62 0.57 0.55
(c) Instagram (WGANGP)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 10k
full bb 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.72 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.49
full bb (calibrated) 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.80 0.72 0.65 0.57 0.56
wb 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.72 0.55 0.50 0.50 0.49
wb (calibrated) 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.92 0.79 0.73 0.67 0.58 0.57
Table 11: Attack performance before and after calibration for
non-image datasets w.r.t. GAN training set sizes. bb: black-
box; wb: white-box.
B.5 Comparison to baseline attacks
Table 12 corresponds to Figure 11 in the main paper. Table 13
corresponds to Figure 12 in the main paper.
PGGAN WGANGP DCGAN VAEGAN
full bb (LOGAN) 0.56 0.57 0.52 0.50
full bb (MC) 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.50
full bb (ours calibrated) 0.54 0.54 0.52 0.51
partial bb (ours calibrated) 0.58 0.63 0.56 0.59
wb (ours calibrated) 0.68 0.66 0.55 0.76
dis (LOGAN) 0.91 0.83 0.83 0.61
Table 12: Comparison of different attacks on CelebA. bb:
black-box; wb: white-box; dis: accessible discriminator.
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(a) MIMIC-III (WGANGP)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 20k
full bb (LOGAN) 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.83 0.65 0.54
full bb (ours calibrated) 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.94 0.89 0.84 0.67 0.56
wb (ours calibrated) 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.75 0.59
dis (LOGAN) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98
(b) MIMIC-III (MEDGAN)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192
full bb (LOGAN) 0.45 0.57 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.51
full bb (ours calibrated) 0.91 0.71 0.63 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.51
wb (calibrated) 0.96 0.87 0.81 0.75 0.65 0.62 0.57 0.55
dis (LOGAN) 1.00 0.92 0.96 0.90 0.85 0.90 0.80 0.73
(c) Instagram (WGANGP)
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096 8192 10k
full bb (LOGAN) 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.91 0.68 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.55
full bb (calibrated) 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.91 0.80 0.72 0.65 0.57 0.56
wb (calibrated) 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.92 0.79 0.73 0.67 0.58 0.57
dis (LOGAN) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.93
Table 13: Comparison of different attacks on the other two
non-image datasets w.r.t. GAN training set size. bb: black-
box; wb: white-box; dis: accessible discriminator.
B.6 Defense
Table 14 corresponds to Figure 13 in the main paper. Table 15
corresponds to Figure 14 in the main paper.
full black-box partial black-box white-box
w/o DP 0.54 0.58 0.68
w/ DP 0.53 0.56 0.59
Table 14: Attack performance against PGGAN on CelebA
with or without DP defense.
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096
white-box w/o DP 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.83 0.62
white-box w/ DP 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.90 0.70 0.56
full black-box w/o DP 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.79 0.57
full black-box w/ DP 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 0.89 0.68 0.53
Table 15: Attack performance against PGGAN on CelebA
with or without DP defense, w.r.t. GAN training set size.
C Qualitative results
Given query samples x, we show their reconstruction copies
R(x|Gv) and R(x|Gr) obtained in our white-box attack.
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(a) Query (real) images
(b) PGGAN victim model reconstruction
(c) PGGAN (w/ DP) victim model reconstruction
(d) PGGAN reference model reconstruction
(e) WGANGP victim model reconstruction
(f) WGANGP reference model reconstruction
(g) DCGAN victim model reconstruction
(h) DCGAN reference model reconstruction
(i) VAEGAN victim model reconstruction
(j) VAEGAN reference model reconstruction
Figure 15: Reconstruction of query samples x that are in the training set, i.e., x ∈ Dtrain.
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(a) Query (real) images
(b) PGGAN victim model reconstruction
(c) PGGAN (w/ DP) victim model reconstruction
(d) PGGAN reference model reconstruction
(e) WGANGP victim model reconstruction
(f) WGANGP reference model reconstruction
(g) DCGAN victim model reconstruction
(h) DCGAN reference model reconstruction
(i) VAEGAN victim model reconstruction
(j) VAEGAN reference model reconstruction
Figure 16: Reconstruction of query samples x that are not in the training set, i.e., x /∈ Dtrain.
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